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INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN
DIVORCE: NEW YORK'S RELUCTANCE
TO ENTER THE FRAY
GWEN SEAQUIST AND EILEEN KELLY
INTRODUCTION
When emotional distress is a factor in a marriage, it is not
surprising that eventually the marriage may break down and lead to
a divorce. In some cases, the divorcing spouse experiences some
form of emotional or physical abuse. If the allegations are serious
enough, the abused party may wish to seek restitution for the pain
and suffering experienced in the marriage in the form of a tort
lawsuit.' This paper explores the law in New York State regarding
divorce action combined with intentional tort lawsuits for either
assault or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Despite the
frequent occurrence of violence in the marital context, a cause of
action for intentional torts, coupled with a cause of action for the
dissolution of a marriage, is not a well-settled proceeding in New
York. This is so despite the fact that during the past thirty years
there has been a gradual abolition of the doctrine of interspousal
immunity. While in some states, spouses may sue one another for
the intentional tort of emotional distress committed during the
marriage, this has never been done successfully in New York.
Such a proceeding, if allowed at all, is usually one separate from
the divorce proceeding.
Historically, when plaintiffs have attempted to combine divorce
with intentional tort causes of action, the courts have struggled
with the following three issues. First, at what point does conduct,
which is a normal part of the "ebb and flow of married life,",
2
1 This is, in fact, the second most common tort alleged in divorce proceedings,
surpassed only by assault and battery. See, for example, Robert G. Spector,
Marital Torts: Actions for Tortious Conduct Occurring During the Marriage, 5
AM. J. FAM. L. 71 (1991).
2 See, for example, Karp and Karp, Marital Torts: Beyond the Normal Ebb and
Flow,9 AM. J. FAM. L. 89, 95-96 (1995); Krohse, "No Longer Following the
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become so outrageous enough to warrant an award of damages?
Second, when is it appropriate for tort actions, which regulate
blame and award damages, to be joined with divorce proceedings,
which, by definition, are equitable in nature? Third, if the court
allows tort and divorce actions to be joined should it then mandate
joinder or should parties be given the option to combine both
proceedings? And if they fail to join the proceedings, are they then
estopped from ever bringing the other lawsuit? For purposes of this
article, the history of the legal relationship between that of husband
and wife is perhaps best studied beginning with the concept of
interspousal immunity.
THE DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY
The doctrine of interspousal immunity was originally based
on an ancient religious belief that upon marriage, a husband and
wife united to become "one flesh."3  English common law
incorporated this concept into a theory of "illegal identity," where
the wife's existence merged into that of her husband. As a result,
women could not sue, enter into contracts, or own property without
the joinder of their husband. In turn, the husband became liable for
any and all torts committed by his wife. Like much of the English
common law, the concept of interspousal immunity was
incorporated into the laws of the United States. The doctrine of
interspousal immunity remained untouched until the mid-1800's
when a group of legislative Acts severely weakened the "legal
Rule of Thumb-What to Do with Domestic Torts and Divorce Claims," U. ILL.
L. REv. 923, 931 (1997); Karp, Spousal Infliction of Emotional Distress...
Beyond the Normal Ebb and Flow of Married Life, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
LAW 309, 316. ("Its limits, however, are still vaguely defined. The tort involves
more than the subtle ebb and flow of married life. It involves intended harm of
an outrageous nature-not just conduct which is merely insulting, annoying, or
even threatening.")
3 Genesis 2:24. "For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be
united to his wife, and they will become one flesh." For an historical analysis of
the origins of the doctrine of interspousal immunity,See: Waite v. Waite, 593 So.
2d 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1991); Heino v. Harper, 759 P.2d 253 (OR. 1988);
Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615 (4 h Cir. 1981); Counts v. Counts, 266 S.E. 2d 895
(Va. 1980).
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entity, 4 concept. These Acts, known as "The Married Women's
Property Acts," granted women the right to sue, own property, and
enter into contracts. Some states liberally construed these Acts and
allowed recovery against a spouse for specific torts. In most states,
however, the doctrine of interspousal immunity continued under
various public policy rationales. It was believed that the immunity
helped to preserve marital harmony and prevent frivolous suits.
Thus, the reasoning found in the 1877 decision of Abbot v. Abbot5
is typical when it states, "It is better to draw the curtain, shut out
the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive."6 Over
the past twenty years, these rationales have been completely
discredited. With the increased public awareness of violence
against women, many courts have come to the realization that
family unity should not be achieved at the expense of the mental
and physical wellbeing of family members. Often, when
intentional torts are being committed, there is no marital harmony
left to be preserved. In addition, allowing such suits may actually
serve as a deterrent to a violent family member who is disposed to
inflict injury on his or her spouse and children.7 Time has also
shown that the wave of frivolous litigation, which was supposed to
occur when interspousal immunity was abolished, is unfounded.
4 Laura H. Wanamaker, Waite v. Waite: The Florida Supreme Court Abrogates
the Doctrine ofInterspousal Immunity, 45 Mercer L. Rev. 903. Winter (1994 ;
David Pfeuffer, Chiles v. Chiles: Divorce, Torts, and Scandal-Texas Style, 42
BAYLOR L. REv. 309, Spring (1990), Kniskem, Interspousal Tort Liability:
Abrogation ofInterspousal Immunity: Part I, 68 Mar Fla. B.J. 83 (1994);
Martha Vardiman, Ohio Abolishes Intrafamilial Tort Immunity: Shearer v.
Shearer, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 305 (1986), Jill Lebowitz, "Giovine v. Giovine:
Pursuit of Tort Claims for Domestic Violence in New Jersey and the Creation of
a New Tort Cause ofAction for "Battered Woman's Syndrome, 17 WOMEN's
RTS. L. REP. 259 (1996).
5 Abbot v. Abbot, 67 Me. 304, 306, (1877). The court found torts unnecessary
in a marital context because, "The married woman has remedy enough. The
criminal courts are open to her... [and] as a last resort, if need be, she can
prosecute at her husband's expense a suit for divorce." In addition, it was
thought that if the immunity were lifted, spouses would use fraud and collusion
to defraud insurance companies.6Id
7 Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 121 (Nov.
2001).
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NEW YORK'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW RECOVERY ON INTENTIONAL
TORTS
With the main rationales destroyed, forty-five states have
now fully abrogated interspousal tort immunity, opening the door
for spouses to sue one another under numerous torts, including the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 New York
removed the final barrier to a married woman's right to sue her
husband for a personal tort, legislatively. 9 Despite the availability
of this remedy for victims of abuse, the strong change in public
attitude toward protecting victims of abuse and the deterrent effect
such suits could have, New York nevertheless refuses to allow
recovery for intentional torts in a divorce proceeding. 10
Why are the New York courts, as a matter of public policy,
opposed to allowing additional monetary relief to divorcing
spouses engaged in extreme and outrageous behavior? The New
York Court of Appeals addressed this issue only once, in its 1968
decision Weicker v. Weicker. At the trial court level, the plaintiff
had alleged that her husband violated New York General
Obligations Law, § 3-313. This law gives married women the right
to sue her husband for wrongful and tortious acts. 1 Based on the
8 Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812
P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)
9 General Obligations Law, §3--313 Also see: Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106,
110, 22 N.E.2d 254, 255, 128 A.L.R. 1015; Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438,
442, 46 N.E.2d 509, 511, 146 A.L.R. 702; People v. Morton, 308 N.Y. 96, 98,
123 N.E.2d 790, 791. The New York statute provides that : "1. A married
woman has a right of action for an injury to her person, property or character or
for an injury arising out of the marital relation, as if unmarried.. A married
woman has a right of action against her husband for his wrongful or tortious
acts resulting to her in any personal injury as defined in section thirty-seven-a
of the general construction law..."
10 Weicker v. Weicker, 22 N.Y.2d 8, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732, 237 N.E.2d 876 (1968);
Eller v. Eller, 136 A.D.2d 678, 524 N.Y.S.2d 93(1968).
" "The statute provides, in part: 'A married woman has a right of action against
her husband for his wrongful or tortious acts resulting to her in any personal
injury as defined in section thirty-seven-a of the general construction law, or
resulting in injury to her property, as if they were unmarried...' Sec. 37-a of
the General Construction Law defines 'personal injury' to include 'libel, slander
and malicious prosecution; also an assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other
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statute and public policy, the court held that "[tjhe acts charged
against the husband.. .are wrongful and tortious and that the injury
resulting to the wife is an 'actionable injury'. It is difficult to reach
any other conclusion after studying the long history leading up to
the 1937 amendment." 12
The Court of Appeals did not agree. While the Court
acknowledged that New York law permits "recovery for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress without proof of the
breach of any duty," 13 nevertheless, as a matter of policy, such a
claim would not be allowed in the Weicker's divorce action. Why?
"To sustain the claim for damages would result in a revival of evils
not unlike those which prompted the Legislature in 1935 to outlaw
actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation." 14
In other words, if spouses can recover for intentional torts in a
divorce proceeding, there will be fraud and collusion between
divorcing spouses and third parties that the abolition of the heart
balm statutes in the 1930's was meant to remedy. 15
As one court admonished, "Imagine what might occur if
routine matrimonial actions, most with allegations of cruelty and
abuse, were permitted to escalate into independent tort actions to
recover for intentional infliction of emotional or mental distress."'16
Ironically, in answering this question, there may exist numerous
benefits in opening up the divorce proceeding to a full hearing.
Certainly, there is no guarantee that the system will suffer abuse or
that fraud and collusion would become a mainstay of such
actionable injury to the person either of the plaintiff, or of another." Weicker, v.
Weicker, 28 A.D.2d 138, 141, 283 N.Y.S.2d 385, 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967).
12 Weicker v. Weicker, 279 N.Y.S.2d 852, 856 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty,.1967).
'" Id. at 855.
14 Weicker, 22 N.Y.2d at 11.
15 "In 1935, New York adopted what has become known as a heart balm statute,
[Civil rights Law §§ 80-a-84] which abolished all causes of action ... [based
upon] alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and
breach of contract to marry ..." Gaden v. Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d 80, 84, 323
N.Y.S.2d 955, 272 N.E.2d 471 (1971). The tort of seduction along with other
causes of action for alienation of affection invited "grave abuses ... and in many
cases ... resulted in the perpetration of frauds ..." Id at 85.16 Vasquez v. Vasquez, 670 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742(Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 1998).
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procedures.17 Even if there is a flood of litigation, what better place
to redress such harm than in court? As one court noted, "It is the
business of the court to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the
expense of a 'flood of litigation' and it is a pitiful confession of
incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on
such grounds."18
While the New York courts do not seem so persuaded, they
have given "judicial lip service" to the notion that a claim for
emotional distress is possible under the right circumstances. Those
circumstances include behavior rising to a level deemed
"'outrageous' beyond peradventure."' 9 Apparently, no behavior to
date has met such a standard in New York, a factor hard to take
seriously in light of the statistics in the State for spousal abuse.
20
Yet, litigants have certainly attempted to put forth the theory. In
Reich v. Reich,2' the wife joined her divorce action with a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as an action
under the Federal Violence Against Women Act.22 She claimed
that spousal abuse had left her mentally disabled. The court
dismissed her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
noting that such a claim in a divorce context is allowed only when
the alleged conduct is "'outrageous' beyond peradventure. ',23
Similarly, an oral promise allowing the plaintiff lifetime use of the
17 See: Jones, J. Fanning an Old Flame: Alienation of Affections and Criminal
Conversations Revisited, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 61 (1999).
'8 id.
19 The courts apparently condone a certain amount of diharmony in a marital
relationship, but it crosses the line when it rises to the level of tortious behavior.
"In our view, the circumstances do not constitute a mere matrimonial
dispute.. .(citations omitted) Indeed, the conduct of this defendant seems to fit
nicely within the rule stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (§46[1] [1965]
that: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress. The deliberate and malicious campaign of harassment
vindictively conducted by defendant was, in our view, 'outrageous' beyond
peradventure." Murphy v. Murphy, 109 A.D.2d 965, 966, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457,
459(App. Div. 1985).
20 See, "Statistics on Domestic Violence"
http://www.global2000.net/evangelist/archive/htm/domviol2.htm.
21 Reich v. Reich, 657 N.Y.S.2d 671 (App. Div. First Dept. 1997).
22 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
23 Id. at 672.
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home, when broken, was not outrageous enough to sustain a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.24
New York courts have also contended that to date no
behavior has been "outrageous enough" to warrant a finding of
emotional distress. 25 This is so in spite of the multitude of cases
in New York in which parties are suing for divorce. A reading of
the descriptions is a chronicle of abuse.26 In those states where the
plaintiff prevailed on an emotional abuse theory, they have had to
prove extreme abuse such as rape, assault, or threats, of assault.
Falsely telling a spouse that he had contracted AIDS and
requesting his wife to take their son home to Canada so he would
not have to see his father die was actionable. 27 An affair, by itself,
however, does not constitute the tort.28 Nor do fraud and adultery
combined rise to the level of emotional distress. 29 Nor does a
claim that a spouse engaged in an extramarital affair that resulted
24 Wiener v. Wiener, 444 NYS.2d 130 (2nd Dept. 1981) "Absent physical
contact or direct physical injury, however, the acts complained of do not amount
to a cognizable cause of action in tort unless they constituted conduct 'beyond all
reasonable bounds of decency."' Id. at 131.
25 "[Iun determining when the tort of outrage should be recognized in the marital
setting, the threshold of outrageousness should be set high enough--or the
circumstances in which the tort is recognized should be described precisely
enough so that the social good from recognizing the tort will not be outweighed
by unseemly and invasive litigation of meritless claims." Hakkila, 812 P.2d at
1323-1326.
26 See for example, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney).
27 Whelan v. Whelan, 588 A.2d 251 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991).
28 Poston v. Poston, 436 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). The husband
contended that his wife's affair caused him "extreme mental anguish, distress,
anxiety, physical damage, emotional damage, and financial losses and damage."
Id. at 856. The court rejected this argument because the evidence of an affair
alone is not the type of conduct that "exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by
decent society' or the type of conduct that "causes mental distress of a very
serious kind."' (quoting Prosser, The Law of Torts, s 12 (4th ed. 1971)). "We find
that appellant's allegation of adultery does not evidence the extreme and
outrageous conduct which is essential to this cause of action." Id.29 Whittington v. Whittington, 766 S.W.2d. 73. (Ky. Ct. App. 1989). (the wife
sued the husband in the divorce proceeding for the tort of outrageous conduct,
but the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action because the
husband's fraud and adultery did not rise to the necessary level of
outrageousness.)
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in the fear of contracting a sexually transmitted disease. 30 Neither
is preventing visitation, even against court orders, outrageous
enough to warrant emotional distress. 3'
Ironically, the only New York litigant who came close to
prevailing on a claim of emotional distress occurred in a "live-in"
rather than a marriage situation. In Murphy v. Murphy,32 the
plaintiff brought an action against the defendant whom she had
been living with for the past fourteen years, for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The jury had awarded her $90,000
in damages after listening to testimony, which alleged that the
defendant had killed the plaintiffs Canadian goose, smashed
windows, assaulted her, and destroyed her personal property. The
plaintiff claimed these actions took place after their relationship
had ended, even though she had remained living in the defendant's
house. The court ruled that "the behavior of the defendant . . .
occurred after whatever relationship in fact existed between the
parties had terminated."3 3 Thus, the court managed to end-run the
existing precedent 34 and upheld the award of damages.
As a general rule the New York cohabiting individuals will
not prevail in a lawsuit combining intentional torts with the
dissolution of a "non-marital relationship." For example, in Baron
v. Jeffer,35 the parties were not married, but had been living
together as husband and wife. Plaintiff sought to recover damages
for intentional infliction of emotional distress against her ex-
boyfriend alleging, among other things, assault. Referring to
Weicker, the court held "that it would be contrary to public policy
to recognize the existence of this type of tort in the context of
disputes, as here, arising out of the differences which occur
30 Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994); Zaremba v. Chliburn, 949 S.W.2d
822 ( Tex. App. 1997)
Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct.1987).
31 Hetfeld v. Bostick, 901 P.2d 986 (Or. Ct. App.1995).
32 Murphy,, 486 N.Y.S2d at 457.
33 Id at 459.
34 See, e.g., Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d. 604 (N.J. Super. Ct.199 1). (Wife's
eleven-year affair occurring during the parties' marriage was not outrageous
enough to support a tort action.)
35 98 A.D.2d 810, 811,469 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div.1983).
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between persons, who although not married, have been living
together as husband and wife.
3 6
Today, Weicker exemplifies matrimonial disputes that are
not actionable, while Murphy sets the standard for outrageous
conduct, although not in a matrimonial context. At present,
however, the finding in Weicker and Baron that intentional
emotional distress in a divorce proceeding is not winnable between
spouses, has not been overruled, leaving the merits of future claims
tenuous.
TEXAS ADOPTS INTENTIONAL TORTS
Why have other states come full circle on this issue while
New York has not? The purpose of this section is to examine the
odyssey taken by the Texas courts, which initially denied
emotional distress claims in divorce proceedings, yet recently
reversed themselves and the state's public policy toward abused
spouses. Numerous other states are also moving in the same
direction3 . If other jurisdictions have concluded that allowing the
tort protects spouses in the marital context, then the question
remains: Why hasn't New York?
Texas first recognized emotional distress as a compensable
injury in 1890.38 Initially, Texas limited recovery to injuries
where the emotional distress was manifested by physical
36 Id. at 816.See also: Jose F. v. Pat, 154 Misc.2d 883 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). A
case in which a man cohabiting with a woman alleged fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. In Artache v. Goldin, 133 A.D.2d 596 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1987), the Second Department declared, "It would be contrary to
public policy to recognize the existence of this type of tort in the context of
disputes, as here, arising out of the differences which occur between persons
who, although not married, have been living together as husband and wife for an
extended period of time."
37 See Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts And Divorce:
Constraints And Possibilities, "31 New Eng. L. Rev. 319, 319-395 (1997).38 Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. 1987).
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symptoms and only when coupled with a willful tort.39 Beginning
in 1967, the Texas courts altogether removed the requirement of
physical manifestations 4° holding that one could recover even if
the injuries were limited to mental abuse. Regardless of these
holdings, coupling emotional distress with a divorce proceeding
was not recognized.4' In language strikingly similar to New
York's, the court reasoned that, "...permitting such separate
damages in divorce actions would result in evils similar to those
avoided by the legislature's abrogation of fault as a ground for
divorce. 4
Just four years later, however, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed Chiles in the 1993 decision Twyman v. Twyman,43 and
announced, "... we expressly adopt the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and hold that such a claim can be brought in
a divorce proceeding." 44  The court reviewed its own judicial
history and found two factors significant. First, the Texas
legislature had long before abolished the doctrine of interspousal
immunity, thereby opening the doors to lawsuits between spouses.
Second, Texas recognized the tort of emotional distress, whether
39 Both the New York and the Texas courts have adopted the Restatement's
definition of emotional distress. A significant aspect of the Restatement is its
recognition of both intentional as well as negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims.
40 Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App. 1989). The court acknowledged
that proof of physical injury is no longer required to recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d
649 (Tex. 1987).
One month after it issued the opinion in St. Elizabeth Hospital, the Texas
Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Price,732 S.W.2d 316. In the Price
case, the court re-examined the doctrine of interspousal immunity, which
mandates that one spouse cannot sue another for negligent conduct, and
unequivocally abolished the doctrine "as to any cause of action." Id. at 319.41 "There were no pleadings, evidence or issues related to physical injury. The
reluctance of Texas courts to adopt the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, coupled with the retreat in Texas and in other jurisdictions from the
recognition of negligent infliction of emotional distress without physical
symptoms, leads us to the conclusion that the tort should not be recognized in a
divorce action." Chiles, 779 S.W. 2d at 131.
42 Id.
4' 855 S.W.2d at 619.
44Id. at 620.
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coupled with negligence or intentional actions for personal
injuries, as a viable cause of action. 45 In short, if spouses could
sue one another, and if emotional distress could be proved with or
without physical injuries, then spouses could sue one another for
emotional distress without physical injuries as a by-product of a
divorce action. With regard to the fear that the courts were opening
a 'flood of litigation', the court reasoned that once Texas abolished
the doctrine of interspousal immunity, it made no sense that
spouses would find a safe harbor in their marriage to abuse one
another. Even prior to the Twyman decision, the Texas courts
began edging toward a reversal of their own decisions. Unlike New
York, Texas stated as a matter of policy, "it is the duty of this court
to continually monitor the legal doctrines of this state to insure the
public is free from unwarranted restrictions on the right to seek
redress for wrongs committed against them.,
46
Since Twyman, numerous plaintiffs have recovered
significant sums of money for intentional torts occurring during the
marital state.47 The law has its detractors, however. Despite the
availability of the claim of action, some writers claim that too few
plaintiffs have prevailed on the merits.48 Nevertheless, the
protection and remedy exists, in spite of a less than perfect
outcome, if plaintiffs can meet the standards of abuse set forth in
the Restatement. Considering the floodgate theory has been so far
disproved in Texas, it is especially difficult to understand how
45 Id. at 624, citing: Price, 732 S.W.2d at319.
46St. Elizabeth Hosp., 730 S.W.2d at 653-654.
47 Yet, Texas still does not recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress.
On the same day as the Twyman decision, the Texas Supreme Court handed
down Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex Sup. Ct. 1993), which eliminated
negligent infliction of emotional distress as a cognizable cause of action in
Texas.
47 "Moreover, court opinions discuss the infrequency with which relief has been
granted for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Yet, with their
decisions in Boyles-and Twyman, the Texas Supreme Court intimated that it was
offering to victims of sexual exploitation and harassment an improved remedial
path with its "new" cause of action." Mae C. Quinn, The Garden Path of Boyles
v. Kerr and Twyman v. Twyman: An Outrageous Response to Victims of Sexual
Misconduct, 4 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 247, 252 (Summer 1995).
BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
New York courts continue to deny a forum for the redress of any
wrong that could encourage domestic tranquility.49
PERMISSIVE AND MANDATORY JOINDER
Another reason why some states keep divorce and tort
actions separate involves issues of permissive and mandatory
joinder. Some states allow an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress for incidents that occurred during the marriage,
but do not allow the claims to take place in the divorce
proceeding. 50 If, however, the state requires that the two claims
are joined (if the joinder is mandatory) then does the failure to
raise the tort in the divorce preclude a subsequent action? Stated
another way, if joinder is mandatory, then does resjudicata apply
to the subsequent action?5'
The problems with joinder were described as follows: If the
former wife is forced to bring her claim for damages either
simultaneously with, or prior to, her complaint for divorce, she
will be forced to elect between three equally
unacceptable alternatives: (1) Commence a tort
49 "Analysts worried, if suits claiming negligent or even intentional inflictiion of
emotional distress were permitted, a tidal wave could be expected. The
doomsayers were wrong. The Chiles verdict was overturned in 1989 by an
appellate court in Huston. The Texas Supreme Court refused to review the case
and the deluge.., never materialized. Rorie Sherman, When Divorce is Not
Enough, NAT'L L. J., September 23, 1991, at 1.
50 "According to the ABA's 'Marital and Parental Torts,' six other states have
either expressly or by implication sanctioned such joinders: Alabama, Georgia,
Nevada, New Yor, Texas and Tennessee. But other states have Prohibited or
discouraged the joinder of a tort claim in a divorce action: Arizona, Colorado,
Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Utah and Wisconsin." Id.
51 The basic principle of the application of the resjudicata doctrine is described
as follows: "When a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of
the plaintiff: (1) [t]he plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the
original claim or any part thereof.. ." Restatement (Second), Judgments Sect.
18 (1982); "Original claim" has been defined by the Restatement in Sect. 24(1):
"[t]he claim [that is] extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series
of connected transactions, out of which the action arose." Restatement
(Second), Judgments Sect. 24(1)).
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action during the marriage and possibly endure
additional abuse; (2) join a tort claim in a divorce
action and waive the right to a jury trial on the tort
claim; or (3) commence an action to terminate the
marriage, forego the tort claim, and surrender the
right to recover damages arising from spousal
abuse.1
2
As a result, many states that mandate joinder have "carved
out an exception" to the rule of resjudicata, allowing a subsequent
lawsuit in spite of the fact that some of the same issues will be
raised in both proceedings. 53
Similarly, when the state allows a permissive joinder, many
of the same questions remain about the impact of res judicata. If
the issue is not joined, does that preclude a subsequent lawsuit? In
effect, does permissive joinder really mean claim preclusion, thus
making it mandatory? The cases do not address these issues
squarely. If the state adheres to a no-fault divorce doctrine, an
exception to res judicata may exist. By defmition, because fault
cannot be considered in the divorce, it must be litigated in a
subsequent proceeding. 5
4
52 Stuart v. Stuart, 143 Wis.2d 347, 352, 421 N.W.2d 505, 508. (1988).
53 "Divorce and tort actions lack an identity of causes of action or claims.
Applying the res judicata doctrine to bar the tort action fails to achieve the
doctrine's objectives and would be fundamentally unfair. Therefore, we
conclude that a doctrine of res dudicata cannot act as a bar to [a post-divorce]
tort action." Nash v. Overholser, 757 P.2d 1180, 1181-1182 (Idaho 1988).
54 Where the wife filed a civil action three months after the divorce decree for
assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress for incidents that
occurred during the marriage, the trial court dismissed on the grounds of res
judicata, equitable estoppel and waiver. Stuart v. Stuart, 410 N.W.2d. 632, 634.
(Wis Ct. App. 1987). On appeal, the court reversed, stating that "for res
judicata to act as a bar to a subsequent action, there must be not only an identity
of the parties but also an identity of the causes of action or claims in the two
actions." Id. at 635.
"In the Stuarts' divorce proceedings, the issues litigated were the termination of
the marriage and the equitable division of the marital estate. Under Wisconsin's
no-fault divorce code, the court without regard to the fault of the parties makes
these determinations. Consequently, in making the financial allocation between
the parties, the court could not consider one spouse's tortious conduct or, based
upon that conduct, award the injured spouse punitive damages or compensatory
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Likewise, if the court in the divorce did not address the
issues in the tort claim, then there is nothing to collaterally estop,
leading many courts to the conclusion that the issues should be
litigated in a separate proceeding. So, when a wife believed that
her husband was involved in a conspiracy to kill her, the lawsuit
for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not barred by
res judicata.5 Other courts considering this issue conclude that
the tort claim is not barred by res judicata when the fact was not
litigated in the divorce action.5 6 Some courts have called this a
"unique and limited exception to the doctrine of resjudicata.'5 7
If damages are not addressed in the divorce, that is also a
reason for a separate suit. "The purpose of a divorce action is to
dissolve the marital relationship and effect the legal separation of
damages for past pain, suffering, and emotional distress." Id.. Since the same
issues were not litigated, resjudicata did not prohibit the subsequent suit.
55 Vance v. Chandler, 597 N.E.2d 233, 237-38 (11. App. Ct. 1992). "While the
facts underlying the instant tort issues were apparently raised in the dissolution
proceedings between plaintiff and Morton, we find from the record that those
issues were neither litigated nor determined in the divorce proceeding.
Accordingly, we find plaintiffs amended complaint is not barred by collateral
estoppel." Id.
56 For example, in Abbott v. Williams, 888 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1989)
(interpreting Alabama law), the court stated "Alabama precedent does not
establish a bright-line rule that a divorce judgment automatically precludes one
former spouse from suing the other in tort based upon conduct which occurred
during the marriage. Rather, it suggests that each such case be examined on its
own facts and circumstances: a case is within the 'field of operation' ... if a
settlement agreement, merged into a final divorce judgment, did not cover the
tort claim, or if all elements of the tort claim were not fully litigated and decided
in the divorce action, even though the divorce action has proceeded to final
judgment." Id. at 1554. On the other hand, this same jurisdiction has decided
that if the facts were litigated in the divorce action, then resjudicata does bar a
subsequent tort action. Weil v. Lammon, 503 So.2d 830, (Ala. 1987) "[G]iven
the liberal joinder allowed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no
reason why all known claims between spouses in a divorce action should not be
settled in that litigation." Id. at 832.
57 Nash v. Overholser, 757 P.2d. 1180 ( In Nash, almost a year after entrance of
the divorce decree, the wife filed a separate lawsuit for assaults that occurred
during the marriage. The court upheld her right to litigate the tort claims
because the "tort allegations were neither pleaded nor addressed during the
divorce proceedings and, in fact, Mrs. Nash's complaint alleged irreconcilable
difference, not physical or mental cruelty, as the grounds for divorce." Id. at
1181.
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man and wife, while a tort action is brought to recover
compensation for injuries suffered as a result of a civil wrong. It is
settled that damages for personal injuries cannot be requested in a
divorce proceeding. 5 8 Under this doctrine, the tort action should,
under the 'single controversy' doctrine, have been "presented in
conjunction with [the divorce] as part of the overall dispute
between the parties in order to lay at rest all their legal differences
in one proceeding and avoid the prolongation and fractionalization
of litigation."
59
As a result, when the issues sought to be addressed in the
tort action are joined in the divorce, and settled by agreement of
the parties, then the court will invoke collateral estoppel to prevent
any subsequent lawsuits. For example, when the parties in the
58 Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 529 A.2d 909, 911 (1987) (citing: Kennard
v. Kennard, 87 N.H. 320, 326-27, 179 A. 414, 419 (1935). Thus the court
allowed the subsequent lawsuit in spite of resjudicata.
59 Hutchings v. Hutchings, 1993 WL 57741, 10 (Conn. Super. Ct.).Just as there
are numerous arguments supporting the separation of the causes of action, there
are many arguments in favor ofjoinder. These include:
1. The preservation ofjudicial resources, by combining claims.
2. Matters regarding children do not have to be protracted because all
matters can be addressed by motion.
3. It is better to decide the tort matter first, establishing any financial
liabilities of the parties, and then let the judge make her divorce
decision and distribution taking into account the jury's verdict and
award of damages in the tort action.
4. "The factual overlap between the grounds and remedies in the
divorce and tort actions alone makes the spouses marriage and the
victim spouses tort claim a "convenient trial unit," and thus outweigh
non-joinder.
5. The procedural inefficiency that results when the tort and divorce actions are
not combined was illustrated in Simons v. Simons" Id.Or, as summarized in
another case, "This court is not satisfied that a flood of litigation with fraudulent
claims or the resurrecting of fault, or the possibility of confusing the issues of
custody, support, and equitable distribution should deny one spouse from suing
the other in a divorce proceeding for emotional distress without physical injury.
There is neither valid policy interest nor logical reason to allow [it]. It is this
court's opinion that an independent cause of action between spouses for
emotional distress without physical injury should exist in a divorce case."
Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604,605,606 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991). (The
adulterous actions of the defendant were ultimately deemed by the court not
outrageous enough to set forth a case for intentional distress).
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divorce entered into a settlement and the husband agreed to pay
compensation to the wife for injuries received during the marriage
as a result of the assaults by him, she was collaterally estopped
from bringing a subsequent lawsuit. 6°
When the same matters are litigated in the divorce
proceeding that would have been litigated in the tort action, this
will preclude a subsequent lawsuit. For example, where the court
considered the wife's allegations of assault and battery in the
divorce and awarded damages, and she, six months later, filed a
second lawsuit for assault and battery, the court dismissed.6'
What of the problem that such joinder confuses equity
issues with money damages? The court stated that, "A plaintiff in
his or her petition may join as independent claims any or as many
claims.., either legal or equitable or both as he [or she] may have
against the opposing party."62 The court set forth the following
reasons: "Courts... avoid[ing]... a multiplicity of suits... [and
encouraging] resolution in one suit of all matters existing between
60 "It is clear that the parties reached a settlement on this matter. Furthermore,
the wife asked court to delay the final judgment so that she could remain
covered by her husband's health insurance policy in the event that she required
future surgery, and the court acquiesced in that request. Having taken the
position that Mrs. Smith did in the divorce action, she is now estopped from
relitigating matters that were settled in that action." Smith v. Smith, 530 So.2d
1389, 1391. (Ala.1988).
61 Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) "The cause of action
under which the plaintiff recovered medical expenses and lost wages in the
divorce litigation technically was not the same-she sued for divorce-but, in
effect, she prevailed on a tort claim. In any event, the wife is collaterally
estopped from relitigating the same factual issues in a 'different' cause of action,
even if resjudicata is not appropriate." Id. at 140.
Numerous other cases dealing with assorted causes of action also reach the
same results. See e.g., Partlow v. Kolupa, 122 A.D.2d 509, 504 N.Y.S.2d 870
(1986), aQfd mem. 69 N.Y.2d 927, 509 N.E.2d 327, 516 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1987)
(subsequent conversion action filed by wife barred by divorce judgment); Davis
v. Dieujuste, 496 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1986) (property rights). "These courts reason,
in essence, that an action for divorce and a tort claim both evolve from a
common factual nucleus and raise interrelated economic issues that should be
resolved in a single proceeding. They view the parties and their marital
relationship as the appropriate basic unit of litigation, not the different legal
theories that can be placed on events that occurred during the marriage."
Hutchings, 1993 WL 57741, at 3.
62 Mogford v. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d 936, 940,(Tex. Civ. App.1981).
VOL. X
2001-2002 INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTREss 45
the parties." 63 Regarding the issue of double recovery, the court
stated, "This argument ignores the unique and separate roles
played by the judge and jury in this divorce case. While the jury
may place a value on certain property... the division of property
in a divorce action is exclusively within the province of the trial
judge, not the jury."64
CONCLUSION
New York Courts should revisit the issue of allowing
litigants in a divorce proceeding to sue in the same action for
intentional torts arising out of the marital context. The policy
issues preventing joinder of both actions is founded on antiquated
fear of fraud and collusion, rather than the best interests of the
parties and protection of the injured spouse. Legislation allowing
joinder could serve to deter the behavior of abusive spouses by
making them fiscally responsible for their actions, thereby adding
to the arsenal of laws seeking to protect victims of domestic abuse.
63 Id.
6 Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. App. 1991) citing Cockerham
v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 173 (Tex. 1975); Roach v. Roach, 672 S.W.524,
529 (Tex.App 1984), no writ).
